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Abstract
The argument that policy risk, i.e. uncertainty about monetary and ﬁscal policy, has
been holding back the economic recovery in the U.S. during the Great Recession has a
large popular appeal. We analyze the role of policy risk in explaining business cycle
ﬂuctuations by using an estimated New Keynesian model featuring policy risk as well
as uncertainty about technology. We directly measure uncertainty from aggregate time
series using Sequential Monte Carlo Methods. While we ﬁnd considerable evidence
of policy risk in the data, we show that the “pure uncertainty”-eﬀect of policy risk is
unlikely to play a major role in business cycle ﬂuctuations. With the estimated model,
output eﬀects are relatively small due to i) dampening general equilibrium eﬀects that
imply a low ampliﬁcation and ii) counteracting partial eﬀects of uncertainty. Finally,
we show that policy risk has eﬀects that are an order of magnitude larger than the ones
of uncertainty about aggregate TFP.
JEL-Classiﬁcation: E32, E63, C11
Keywords: Policy Risk; Uncertainty; Aggregate Fluctuations; Particle Filter; General Equilib-
rium.
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11 Introduction
The supposedly negative inﬂuence of “policy risk”, i.e. uncertainty about ﬁscal and monetary
policy, has become a recurring theme in the political discourse. The popular argument
espoused in speeches and newspaper articles by politicians and economists alike is that the
uncertainty surrounding future policy stuns economic activity by inducing a “wait-and-see
approach”.1 In the following, we think of uncertainty as the dispersion of the economic shock
distribution. Rational consumers and ﬁrms will react to the fact that future shocks will be
drawn from a wider distribution. This reaction is distinct from the ex-post eﬀect of higher
uncertainty resulting from on average more extreme shock realizations.2 The goal of the
present study is to isolate the ﬁrst eﬀect and answer the question: Are uncertainty shocks to
policy variables quantitatively important?
Clearly, during the so-called Great Recession U.S. citizens were facing a period of extraor-
dinary uncertainty regarding economic policy. On the one hand, both the output decline due
to the ﬁnancial crisis and the ﬁscal stimuli designed to counteract this decline had led to a
considerable deterioration of the U.S. ﬁscal situation. Given this unsustainable ﬁscal path,
many commentators and politicians were arguing for a quick consolidation of government
ﬁnances, possibly by raising taxes. On the other hand, the U.S. unemployment rate stood at
9.6% at the end of 2010, its highest value since 1983. Hence, there were considerable calls
for more ﬁscal stimulus, preferably in the form of reduced taxes due to supposedly higher
multipliers (see e.g. Romer and Romer, 2010). At the same time, Republicans and Democrats
were ﬁghting over the continuation of the Bush tax cuts. On the monetary side, the amount
of policy risk was equally high. Hawks and doves at the Federal Reserve System fought over
the extent of quantitative easing and the correct monetary stance given conﬂicting signals
from core and headline inﬂation measures.
Scientiﬁc evidence on the aggregate eﬀects of uncertainty is still inconclusive and mostly
conﬁned to TFP uncertainty. Empirical studies using diﬀerent proxies and identiﬁcation
schemes to uncover the eﬀects of uncertainty have produced a variety of results. One group
of studies reports an important impact of uncertainty about productivity on real aggregate
variables like GDP and employment (Alexopoulos and Cohen, 2009; Bloom, 2009; Bloom
1See e.g. The Wall Street Journal, October 29th, 2009: “For these small businesses, and many others
[...], there’s an additional dark cloud: uncertainty created by Washington’s bid to reorganize a wide swath
of the U.S. economy.” (Fields, 2009). For other proponents of this view, see Boehner (2010); Cantor (2010);
Imrohoroglu (2010); Lowrie (2010); McKinnon (2010); see Klein (2010); Reeve (2010); Wingﬁeld (2010) for
dissenting opinions.
2Uncertainty shocks are mean preserving spreads to the shock distribution. They are not associated with
the expectation of shocks going into a speciﬁc direction, like expecting an expansionary stimulus package.
Hence, they are also distinct from news shocks (Beaudry and Portier, 2006; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2008),
which are future level shocks of which both the sign and the magnitude are already perfectly known today.
2et al., 2010). A one-standard deviation shock to uncertainty in these studies typically leads to
a 1%-2% drop in GDP, followed by a recovery with a considerable overshooting. In contrast,
a second group of studies reports little to no impact at all (Bachmann and Bayer, 2011;
Bachmann et al., 2010; Bekaert et al., 2010; Chugh, 2011; Popescu and Smets, 2010). In
the theoretical literature, while most studies have emphasized the contractionary eﬀects of
uncertainty on economic activity, it is generally acknowledged that there are diﬀerent eﬀects
working in opposite directions, thereby making the overall eﬀect ambiguous. For example,
while an increase in uncertainty may depress investment due to a “wait-and-see approach”,
economic agents may want to self-insure by working more to build up a buﬀer capital stock,
which ceteris paribus leads to an increase in investment.
We answer the question of whether policy risk shocks are quantitatively important in an
estimated DSGE-model. We focus on aggregate uncertainty as it has been shown to have
potentially important output eﬀects (Fernández-Villaverde et al., forthcoming). We add to the
previous literature in the following ways. First, we are to our knowledge the ﬁrst to study the
eﬀect of policy risk on business cycles.3 Second, we directly measure aggregate uncertainty
from the respective time series without the need to resort to proxies. Third, we jointly consider
level shocks and uncertainty shocks. Regarding uncertainty shocks, we focus on policy risk,
i.e. uncertainty about future tax liabilities, government spending, and monetary policy, to
test the hypothesis that policy risk may be an important factor in explaining the prolonged
Great Recession. We also include uncertainty with respect to total factor productivity (TFP)
and investment-speciﬁc technology in order to have a benchmark against which we can
judge our ﬁndings. Fourth, we integrate these processes into a medium-scale New Keynesian
DSGE-model of the type typically used for policy analysis (see e.g. Christiano et al., 2005;
Smets and Wouters, 2007) and solve this model using third-order perturbation methods. We
then estimate the model using the Simulated Method of Moments. This approach allows us
to control for the eﬀects of level shocks to TFP, investment-speciﬁc technology, government
spending, monetary policy, and taxes when estimating the importance of policy risk.
We ﬁnd that the role of policy risk in explaining the prolonged slump is largely overstated.
Although the output eﬀects of policy risk are an order of magnitude larger than the eﬀects of
TFP uncertainty, even a large (two-standard deviation) shock to policy risk decreases output by
3We have recently become aware of independently conducted work by Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011),
studying a similar issue. The studies diﬀer in the set of shocks considered and in the details of the model
speciﬁcation. However, the results are quite similar, with even large uncertainty shocks generating only a
contained output decline. In their baseline calibration, a two-standard deviation policy risk shock decreases
output by 0.06% compared to 0.025% in our estimated baseline speciﬁcation. The advantage of our approach
is that we estimate the parameters of our model. Moreover, we allow for time-varying volatility in technology,
allowing us to relate our ﬁndings to the literature on TFP uncertainty and to “good luck” explanations of the
Great Moderation.
3a mere 0 025%. The reason for this result is the existence of strong general equilibrium eﬀects
that dampen the eﬀects of aggregate uncertainty and imply a low shock ampliﬁcation. Most
notably, monetary policy reacts fast and decisively to current economic conditions, implying
an interest rate response that dampens aggregate ﬂuctuations arising from uncertainty shocks.
If we allow for a stronger ampliﬁcation, uncertainty shocks generate considerably larger output
eﬀects, but at the same time imply counterfactually volatile business cycles.
From a methodological viewpoint, the paper most closely related to our work is Fernández-
Villaverde et al. (forthcoming). Their study also employs Sequential Monte Carlo Methods
combined with third-order perturbation to estimate the eﬀect of interest risk on the Ar-
gentinean economy. In terms of results, our paper is most closely related to Bachmann
and Bayer (2011), who show for the case of idiosyncratic uncertainty about technology that
general equilibrium eﬀects may considerably reduce the eﬀect of uncertainty shocks typically
found in partial equilibrium models (e.g. Bloom, 2009). Our paper is also related to the
work of Primiceri (2005) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008). Using a time-varying Bayesian
VAR and an estimated DSGE-model, respectively, the authors document the importance of
time-varying volatility for explaining the time series behavior of output and inﬂation and
the Great Moderation in particular. We diﬀer from their work in two major points: ﬁrst, we
allow for a non-linear transmission of volatility shocks into the economy. Second, by using a
third-order approximation instead of a ﬁrst-order approximation, we are able to distinguish
uncertainty-eﬀects from the ex-post eﬀect of uncertainty in the form of more extreme level
shocks. We show that their result is mainly due to the diﬀering size of the realized level shocks
when the dispersion of the distribution from which they are drawn changes. In contrast, the
pure uncertainty-eﬀect is only of secondary importance.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a short literature review on
the transmission channels of uncertainty. In Section 3, we build a quantitative business
cycle model featuring several channels identiﬁed in the theoretical literature through which
aggregate uncertainty may impact economic activity. We measure policy risk and technological
uncertainty directly from aggregate time series using Sequential Monte Carlo methods in
Section 4. In Section 5, we feed the uncertainty processes estimated in Section 4 as driving
processes into the model and ﬁt it to U.S. data using a Simulated Method of Moments
approach. With the estimated model at hand, we then study the eﬀects of policy risk in
Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
42 Uncertainty: Potential Transmission Channels
Three diﬀerent mechanisms through which aggregate uncertainty may aﬀect economic activity
have been identiﬁed in the microeconomic literature: Hartman-Abel eﬀects, real option eﬀects,
and precautionary savings. While these categories are helpful in shaping our thinking about
the eﬀects of uncertainty, they are partial equilibrium eﬀects. In general equilibrium, each of
these eﬀects necessarily induces equilibrating price and quantity changes that may signiﬁcantly
dampen the aggregate eﬀects. While in a partial equilibrium model uncertainty may have
ceteris paribus largely contractionary eﬀects on investment and output (e.g. Bloom, 2009), in
general equilibrium wages and interest rates may adjust, thereby signiﬁcantly reducing the
resulting net eﬀect (Bachmann and Bayer, 2011).
The ﬁrst category are the so called Hartman-Abel-eﬀects (Abel, 1983; Hartman, 1972).
Under certain conditions4 it follows from the ﬁrms’s FOC that the expected marginal revenue
product of capital is convex in output prices and TFP.5 Hence, due to Jensen’s Inequality
larger uncertainty about these variables increases the demand for capital and thus investment.
In our model, while capital is predetermined, both the utilization of capital and labor input
can be adjusted, opening up the possibility of expansionary Hartman-Abel eﬀects.
Second, there may be real option eﬀects at work (Bernanke, 1983), e.g. through investment
being (partially) irreversible and/or partially expandable. For example, if the resale (purchase)
price of capital in the future diﬀers from the current acquisition price, a ﬁrm installing capital
that it may sell later, eﬀectively acquires a put option. Moreover, investment today destroys
a call option, namely the opportunity to buy capital later at a possibly lower price. Hence, in
the investment decision these option values have to be taken into account (Abel et al., 1996).
Higher uncertainty decreases investment as the call option to purchase the capital later, which
is “killed” by investing today, becomes more valuable. However, in the presence of partial
reversibility, the value of the put option that is obtained by investing today increases with
higher uncertainty. Hence, the total eﬀect of uncertainty on investment in such a framework
is generally ambiguous.
In our model, several features give rise to option eﬀects. First, capital is predetermined for
one period. Second, the relative price of investment and consumption is stochastic, thereby
giving rise to potentially costly irreversibility and expandability. Third, through the presence
4Constant-returns-to-scale production function with i) a predetermined capital stock, ii) perfect competition,
iii) risk neutrality, and iv) symmetric convex adjustment costs.
5The reason is that labor can ﬂexibly react to shocks and hence the marginal revenue product reacts
stronger than one for one to the movement in the respective variable. To see this, assume a ﬁxed capital stock
of capital and that the output price rises. There is a direct positive eﬀect of this price increase on proﬁts of
quantity times price change. Additionally, there is an positive indirect eﬀect through the increase in optimal
output that is achieved by increasing labor.
5Table 1: Overview: potential transmission mechanism
Hartman-Abel eﬀects Real option eﬀects Precautionary savings
Call Put Interest rate
Investment + − + +/− +
Consumption ? ? ? ? −
Notes: + indicates a positive eﬀect of uncertainty, − a negative eﬀect, and +/− an ambiguous eﬀect on the
respective variable. ? denotes that the respective eﬀect makes no prediction for this variable due to its partial
equilibrium nature.
of depreciation allowances investment generates a tax shield at historical costs of investment
so that investment eﬀectively “kills” the option to purchase this tax shield later. Fourth, the
interest rate in our model is stochastic, giving rise to additional countervailing option eﬀects
as discussed in Ingersoll and Ross (1992).
The third eﬀect is the precautionary saving motive (Leland, 1968), deﬁned as the “additional
saving that results from the knowledge that the future is uncertain” (Carroll and Kimball,
2008). Faced with higher uncertainty, agents may both consume less and work more in order
to self-insure against future shocks, i.e. they build a buﬀer stock.6 As the preferences of the
agents in our model feature prudence (Garcia et al., 2007; Kimball, 1990) uncertainty should
increase precautionary savings in our model.
In the end, due to these three eﬀects acting on diﬀerent variables and potentially working
in opposite directions as well as the presence of general equilibrium eﬀects, only a rigorous
quantitative evaluation can answer the question what the net eﬀect of uncertainty on aggregate
activity is. We pursue this question by estimating a structural model featuring time-varying
volatility, which we present in the next section.
3 A DSGE-model with Policy Risk
We use a standard quantitative New Keynesian business cycle model (Smets and Wouters,
2007). The model economy is populated by a large representative family, a continuum of unions
j ∈ [0,1] selling diﬀerentiated labor services to intermediate ﬁrms, a continuum of intermediate
ﬁrms producing diﬀerentiated intermediate goods using bundled labor services and capital,
and a ﬁnal good ﬁrm bundling intermediate goods to a ﬁnal good. In addition, the model
features a government sector that ﬁnances government spending with distortionary taxation
6Real option eﬀects and the precautionary saving motive are not disjunct eﬀects. Consumption is completely
irreversible as the consumed good is not available for consumption in later periods when the marginal utility
of consumption may be high.
6and transfers, and a monetary authority which sets the nominal interest rate according to an
interest rate rule.
3.1 Household Sector
The economy is populated by a large representative family with a continuum of members,
each consuming the same amount and working the same number of hours. Preferences
are deﬁned over per capita consumption Ct and per capita labor eﬀort Lt. Following the
framework in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006), labor is supplied to a continuum of unions
j ∈ [0,1], which are monopolistically competitive and supply diﬀerentiated labor services lt (j).
Household members supply their labor uniformly to all unions. Hence, total labor supply of
the representative family is given by the integral over all labor markets j, i.e. Lt =
  1
0 lt (j)dj.
The labor market structure will be discussed in more detail below. We assume the preference
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where φc ∈ [0,1] measures the degree of internal habit persistence, σc ≤ 1 governs the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σl ≥ 0 is related to the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, and γ ≥ 0 measures the relative disutility of labor eﬀort. The term




makes the preferences non-separable in both consumption and work eﬀort, where σG ∈ [0,1]
parameterizes the strength of the wealth eﬀect on the labor supply. When σG = 1, the
preference speciﬁcation is equal to the one discussed in King et al. (1988), while with σG = 0
the preference speciﬁcation of Greenwood et al. (1988) with no wealth eﬀect on the labor
supply is obtained.








































where the household earns income from supplying diﬀerentiated labor services lt(j) at the real
wage Wt (j) to union j, and from renting out capital services utKt at the rental rate rk
t. In
7addition, it receives lump sum transfers Tt from the government and proﬁts Ξt from owning
the ﬁrms in the economy. All forms of income are taxed at their respective tax rates τn
t and
τk





(Rt−1 − 1) Bt
Pt + Bt
Pt is the after-tax return on savings in bonds, where
the net returns are taxed at the capital tax rate. Bonds are in zero net supply. The household
spends its income on consumption Ct and investment zI
tIt„ where It is gross investment and
zI
t denotes a shock to the relative price of investment in terms of the consumption good. This
price is equal to the technical rate of transformation between investment and consumption
goods. Due to the presence of a temporary shock, it is exogenous and stochastic. Changes in
zI
t do not aﬀect the productivity of already installed capital, but do aﬀect newly installed

















t allows for time-varying volatility and is discussed in detail in Section 4. Apart
from the fact that this form of investment-speciﬁc technology may be an important source of
economic ﬂuctuations (Greenwood et al., 1997, 2000), a stochastic relative price of investment
introduces costly reversibility and expandability of investment into the model as the future
purchase/resale price is stochastic.
The term Φt captures depreciation allowances, which are an important feature of the U.S.







where δτ is the depreciation rate for tax purposes.8 By providing new investment with a tax
shield, depreciation allowances may be important in capturing the dynamics of investment
following shocks (Christiano et al., 2007; Yang, 2005). By providing current investment with
a tax shield at historical investment prices, combined with a stochastic relative price of
investment zI, depreciation allowances contribute to costly reversibility and expandability of
investment.



















where It is gross investment. Household members do not simply rent out capital, but capital
services utKt, where ut denotes the capital utilization, i.e. the intensity with which the
existing capital stock is used. Without loss of generality, capital utilization in steady state
7The lag lengths for the individual exogenous driving processes is chosen to provide a good empirical ﬁt.
Details are provided in Section 4.
8Following Auerbach (1989), we allow the depreciation rate for tax purposes to diﬀer from the physical
rate.
8is normalized to 1. Using capital with an intensity higher than normal incurs costs to the
household in the form of a higher depreciation δ (ut) = δ0 +δ1 (ut − 1)+δ2/2(ut − 1)
2, which,
assuming δ0,δ1,δ2 > 0, is an increasing and convex function of the capital utilization. The
last term in equation (5) captures capital adjustment costs at the household level of the form
introduced by Hayashi (1982), where κ ≥ 0 is a parameter governing the curvature of the cost
function. This functional form implies that the capital adjustment costs are minimized and
equal to 0 in steady state. We choose this type of adjustment costs for three reasons. First,
while this functional form clearly is unable to explain some micro-level phenomena like lumpy
investment, it has nevertheless been shown to provide a good ﬁt of ﬁrm level investment data
and performs better than the Christiano et al. (2005)-formulation with quadratic adjustment
costs in investment changes (Eberly et al., 2008). Second, with the ﬂow speciﬁcation of
Christiano et al. (2005), Tobin’s marginal q would be independent of the capital stock, which
would essentially shut oﬀ intertemporal linkages and thereby the option eﬀects (Wu, 2009).
Thus, the household maximizes its utility (1) by choosing Ct,Bt+1,ut,Kt+1,It,St,Lt,
subject to the constraints (2) - (5).
3.2 Labor Market
The household supplies labor lt (j) equally to a continuum of unions j, j ∈ [0,1]. This labor
market structure allows to introduce diﬀerentiated labor services and staggered wage setting
without letting idiosyncratic wage risk aﬀect the household members, which would make
aggregation intractable. Monopolistically competitive unions supply diﬀerentiated labor lt (j)
to intermediate ﬁrms at wage Wt (j). Every period, each union may re-optimize its wage with
probability (1 − θw),0 < θp < 1. If a union j cannot re-optimize, its nominal wage is indexed
to the price level according to Wt (j)Pt = Π
χw
t−1Wt−1 (j)Pt−1, where χw ∈ [0,1] measures the
degree of indexing. Hence, when the union has not been able to re-optimize for τ periods, its















Household members supply the amount of labor services that is demanded at the current
wage. The objective of each union able to reset its wage is to choose the real wage that




t , where L
comp
t is the aggregate demand for composite labor services and ηw






9and the aggregate wage level Wt =






There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods ﬁrms i, i ∈ [0,1],
which produce diﬀerentiated intermediate goods Yi,t using capital services Kserv
it = uitKit−1
and a composite labor bundle L
comp
it using a Cobb-Douglas production function with capital
share α












1−α − φ > 0 (7)
and Yit = 0 otherwise. The ﬁxed cost of production φ is set to reduce economic proﬁts to 0 in
steady state, thereby ruling out entry or exit (Christiano et al., 2005). The stationary TFP
shock zt follows an AR(2)-process
logzt = ρ
z
1 logzt−1 + ρ
z
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We assume staggered price setting a la Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). Each period,
intermediate ﬁrms can re-optimize their prices with probability (1 − θp),0 < θp < 1. In
between two periods of re-optimization, the prices are indexed to the aggregate price index






χp Pit, where χp ∈ [0,1] governs the degree of
indexation. Intermediate goods producers maximize their discounted stream of proﬁts subject
to the demand from composite goods producers, equation (10).
There is a competitive ﬁnal goods ﬁrm which bundles a ﬁnal good Yt from a continuum of
intermediate goods using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation technology with substitution elasticity
ηp
Yt =














Yt ∀i   (10)
103.4 Government Sector
Government spending, which may be thought of as entering the utility function additively























where ¯ G is government spending in steady state. The government ﬁnances its expenditures
by distortionary taxation of labor at the rate τn
t and capital and interest income at rate τk
t .
We assume AR(2)-processes for the tax rates as this has been found to be a good empirical
description for the U.S. (McGrattan, 1994; Mertens and Ravn, 2010)
τ
k






































where ¯ τn and ¯ τk are the unconditional means of the labor and capital tax rates, respectively.
The government also sets lump-sum transfers Tt to balance the budget. This assumed structure
yields the government budget constraint













Transfers plus government spending plus depreciation allowances equal tax revenues from
taxing labor, capital income, and proﬁts.
We close the model by assuming that the central bank follows a Taylor rule that reacts to




















Here, ρR is a smoothing parameter introduced to capture the empirical evidence of gradual
movements in interest rates (Clarida et al., 2000; Rudebusch, 1995), ¯ Π is the target interest
rate set by the central bank, and the parameters φy and φΠ capture the responsiveness of the
nominal interest rate to deviations of inﬂation and output growth from their steady state
values. We assume that the central bank responds to changes in output rather than its level
as this speciﬁcation conforms better with empirical evidence and avoids the need to deﬁne a
measure of trend growth that the central bank can observe (see Lubik and Schorfheide, 2007).
11Finally, mt is a shock to the nominal interest rate that follows an AR(1)-process
logmt = ρ




t   (16)
The deﬁnition of equilibrium and the market aggregation are standard and omitted for brevity.
4 Policy Risk: Time Series Evidence
In this section, we present empirical evidence on the importance of time-varying volatility
in modeling macroeconomic time series. We demonstrate that the data tend to reject the
homoscedasticity of macroeconomic driving processes and show that a stochastic volatility
(SV) model is able to capture the salient features of the data. Using a particle smoother, we
are able to recover the historical series of uncertainty shocks and show that both “good luck”
and “good policy” contributed to the Great Moderation.
4.1 Estimation Methodology
We perform a two-step estimation procedure. Due to the non-linear solution of the model
required to capture uncertainty eﬀects and the high-dimensional state space, it is compu-
tationally infeasible to jointly estimate all model parameters. Hence, we ﬁrst estimate the
exogenous stochastic driving processes of the model using Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC)
methods. In the next section we feed these processes into the model presented in Section 3
and estimate the parameters of the remaining model equations with a Simulated Method of
Moments (SMM) approach.
The model includes 6 exogenous stochastic driving processes with time-varying volatility,
i.e. capital and labor tax rates, government spending, a monetary policy shock, total factor
productivity, and investment-speciﬁc technology. We estimate these processes on quarterly
U.S. time series, starting in 1960Q1 and using the longest available sample for each series.
Details about the data sources can be found in Appendix A. Because we use a stationary
model, we need to extract the deviations of the non-stationary time series from their respective
trend. Hence, we apply a one-sided HP-ﬁlter to the logarithms of government spending and
the two technology processes. Using a one-sided, i.e. “causal” ﬁlter (Stock and Watson,
1999) assures that the time ordering of the data remains undisturbed and the autoregressive
structure is preserved. We allow for AR(2)-processes in all variables, except for the monetary
policy shocks,9 as the partial autocorrelations generally indicate the presence of a second
9Although theory suggests that monetary policy shocks in the Taylor rule should be unpredictable and
thus i.i.d., we ﬁnd a moderate degree of ﬁrst-order autocorrelation.
12root diﬀerent from zero. Figure 1 shows the time series of the exogenous driving processes
on which we estimate our laws of motion. In particular for monetary policy, the presence of
time-varying volatility is immediately evident. In Appendix C.1, we provide further evidence
for the presence of time-varying volatility.











































Figure 1: Time series of exogenous driving processes.
Notes: From left to right and top to bottom: capital taxes, labor taxes, TFP, investment-
speciﬁc technology, monetary policy shocks, and government spending. Tax rates are demeaned;
government spending and technology processes are detrended using one-sided HP-ﬁlter.
There are two major competing approaches to model time-varying standard deviations:
GARCH models and stochastic volatility (SV) models (Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-
Ramírez, 2010). In the standard GARCH model, σ2
t is a function of the squared scaled lagged
innovation in the level equation ν2
t−1 and its own lagged value: σ2
t = ω +α(σt−1νt−1)2 +βσ2
t−1.
The GARCH model has one important drawback: there are no distinct volatility shocks. The
only innovations to the volatility equation are past level shocks, meaning that they cannot be
separated from volatility shocks. As we are especially interested in the eﬀects of shocks to the
volatility, we cannot use a GARCH model but instead employ a stochastic volatility model.
Speciﬁcally, we model the standard deviations σi
t as an AR(1) stochastic volatility process
13(see e.g. Fernández-Villaverde et al., forthcoming; Shephard, 2008)
σ
i









t ∼ N(0,1), (17)
where ¯ σi is is the unconditional mean of σi
t, i ∈ {τk,τn,g,m,z,zI}. The shock to the
volatility εi
t is assumed to be independent from the level shock νi
t.
Due to the nonlinearity embedded in the stochastic volatility setup of the shocks, we
cannot simply employ the Kalman ﬁlter as in the case of linearity and normally distributed
shocks. For this case, Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2007) propose to use the
Sequential Importance Resampling (SIR) particle ﬁlter, a special application of the more
general class of SMC methods, to evaluate the likelihood.10
After obtaining the likelihood of the observables given the parameters, we use a Tailored
Randomized Block Metropolis-Hastings (TaRB-MH) algorithm (Chib and Ramamurthy, 2010)
to maximize the posterior likelihood. The prior distributions of the parameters, which are
relatively weak, are given in Table 2.11
We are also interested in backing out the historical values of the latent state σt, given
the whole set of observations. After ﬁltering, it is straightforward to employ the backward-
smoothing routine (Godsill et al., 2004) to obtain a historical distribution of the volatilities.
The smoothed values were computed at the mean of the posterior distribution using 10,000
particles.
4.2 Estimation Results
The estimation results are presented in Table 2. Detailed convergence diagnostics are shown
in Appendix C.2. In general, all parameters are quite precisely estimated as evidenced by
the percentiles. All shocks, except for the monetary policy shock, exhibit a high degree of
persistence in their levels, with less persistence in their volatilities. Moreover, the estimated
processes show considerable evidence of uncertainty, with ηi ranging between 0 3 and 0 6. As
a one-standard deviation uncertainty shock increases the volatility of the respective process
by (exp(ηi) − 1) × 100 percent, such a shock increases the variance of capital taxes, labor
taxes, TFP, investment speciﬁc technology, monetary policy, and government spending by
10Technical details of the algorithms used in this subsection can be found in Appendices B.1-B.3.
11For the autoregressive parameters of the level equation ρi
1 and ρi
2, we impose a uniform prior for each
of the corresponding autoregressive roots over the stability region (−1,+1). Let ξ1 and ξ2 be the roots of
such an AR(2)-process. The autoregressive parameters corresponding to these roots can be recovered from:
ρ1 = ξ1 + ξ2 and ρ2 = −ξ1ξ2   The posterior distribution was computed from a 20,500 draw Monte Carlo
Markov Chain using 3,000 particles, where the ﬁrst 2,500 draws were discarded as burn-in draws. Acceptance
rates were generally between 20% and 45%. We also checked identiﬁability of the SV-process by simulating
data from the process and trying to recover the true parameters from this artiﬁcial data.
14Table 2: Prior and Posterior Distributions of the Shock Processes
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distribution Mean Std. Dev. Mean 5 Percent 95 Percent
Capital Tax Rates
ρ1 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 0.856 0.819 0.893
ρ2 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 0.103 0.070 0.137
ρσ Beta* 0.90 0.100 0.795 0.745 0.860
ησ Gamma 0.50 0.100 0.379 0.333 0.426
¯ σ Uniform -7.00 5.333 -5.071 -5.361 -4.786
Labor Tax Rates
ρ1 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 1.051 1.018 1.084
ρ2 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 -0.052 -0.085 -0.019
ρσ Beta* 0.90 0.100 0.581 0.514 0.670
ησ Gamma 0.50 0.100 0.651 0.587 0.718
¯ σ Uniform -7.00 5.333 -5.901 -6.253 -5.531
Total Factor Productivity
ρ1 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 1.021 0.965 1.080
ρ2 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 -0.175 -0.230 -0.125
ρσ Beta* 0.90 0.100 0.679 0.611 0.781
ησ Gamma 0.50 0.100 0.320 0.272 0.369
¯ σ Uniform -7.00 5.333 -5.349 -5.555 -5.138
Investment-Speciﬁc Technology
ρ1 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 1.420 1.369 1.468
ρ2 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 -0.501 -0.536 -0.461
ρσ Beta* 0.90 0.100 0.807 0.765 0.861
ησ Gamma 0.50 0.100 0.332 0.295 0.368
¯ σ Uniform -7.00 5.333 -6.206 -6.427 -5.983
Government Spending
ρ1 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 0.919 0.866 0.972
ρ2 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 -0.028 -0.079 0.018
ρσ Beta* 0.90 0.100 0.719 0.623 0.865
ησ Gamma 0.50 0.100 0.295 0.227 0.368
¯ σ Uniform -7.00 5.333 -4.887 -5.193 -4.585
Monetary Policy Shock
ρ1 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 0.427 0.385 0.469
ρσ Uniform* 0.90 0.100 0.921 0.895 0.947
ησ Beta* 0.50 0.100 0.364 0.330 0.400
¯ σ Gamma -7.00 5.333 -5.188 -5.512 -4.849
Notes: Beta* indicates that the parameter divided by 0.999 follows a beta distribution. Uniform* indicates
that the roots of the autoregressive process are estimated instead of the autoregressive coeﬃcients and follow
the speciﬁed prior distribution.
1546%, 92%, 38%, 39%, 34%, and 45%, respectively.12 Appendix C.3 shows the results of model
misspeciﬁcation tests applied to the SV model. In general, the model ﬁts the data well and
cannot be rejected.
The relevance of stochastic volatility in modeling the behavior of the exogenous driving
processes can be seen in the smoothed estimates of the historical variances of the shocks
in Figure 2. The end of the 1960s and particularly the 1970s were plagued by high shock
volatilities, both in the technology and the policy shocks. Particularly during the 1970s, the
volatilities increased and reached their sample maxima for both tax rates and technology
shocks. In contrast, the decade from 1985 to 2000 was characterized by shock volatilities to
the technology variables well below their unconditional mean, indicating the role of “good
luck” in explaining the Great Moderation. However, from about 1990 on “good policy”
also contributed to this phenomenon as is evidenced by the low volatilities of the tax and
government spending shocks, although the change in volatility is not as pronounced for the
latter. For monetary policy shocks, there is clear evidence of a lower shock volatility following
the Volcker disinﬂation from 1979-1983, a trend that also continued under Greenspan. In
contrast, the early tenure of Volcker experienced a volatility of monetary shocks considerably
larger than during the ﬁrst oil price shock. With the height of the dot-com bubble the
volatility of TFP shocks somewhat increased again, while the investment-speciﬁc technology
growth remained tranquil over the whole 2000s. The largest changes in volatility in the 2000s
came under George W. Bush who considerably changed the tax law, resulting in a pronounced
increase in the volatility of tax rates. At the end of our sample, the Great Recession again
results in an increase in policy risk with a rise in the volatility of government spending, tax
rates, and monetary policy to comparable levels as after 9/11. For government spending and
taxes, this mostly reﬂects the provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
that contained $288 billion in tax relief to companies and individuals, e.g. in the form of $116
billion in payroll tax relief.
Note that the SV-framework used in the present study does not imply a mechanical link
between the level shocks and the volatility shocks as a GARCH-model would do. Of course,
as a comparison of Figures 1 and 2 shows, a large level shock tends to coincide with an
increase in the conditional variance. However, the reason for this increase in the estimated
conditional variance is not a mechanical eﬀect of this level shock subsequently entering the
volatility equation. Rather, the Bayesian estimation of the SV-model weighs the likelihood of
observing such a large shock being drawn from a narrow distribution, i.e. without observing a
simultaneous/previous volatility shock, against the likelihood of observing a shock of this size
12Thus, e.g. a one-standard deviation monetary policy risk shock increases the volatility of the monetary
policy shocks from exp(−5 19) = 0 56% to exp(−5 19 + 0 364) = 0 8%.
16that is drawn from a wider distribution due to the occurrence of a variance shock.










































Figure 2: Smoothed standard deviations. From left to right and top to bottom: capital
taxes, labor taxes, TFP, investment-speciﬁc technology, monetary policy shocks,
and government spending.
Notes: Red dotted line: unconditional mean; shaded area: two standard deviation bands.
5 Fitting the Model to the Data
Using the parameter estimates of the stochastic driving processes obtained in the previous
section, we are now in a position to estimate the deep parameters of the model presented in
Section 3.
5.1 Simulated Method of Moments Estimation
We use the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) approach as proposed in Ruge-Murcia
(2010). Intuitively, this method minimizes the weighted distance between the empirical
17Table 3: Parameters ﬁxed prior to estimation
Parameter Value Target/Motivation Parameter Value Target/Motivation
¯ Π 1 Zero inﬂ. steady state σG 0.001 Jaimovich-Rebelo (2009)
β 0.99 Standard value ηp 10 11% Markup
δ0 0.025 10% annual deprec. ηw 10 11% Markup
δ1 0.0351 ¯ u = 1 α 0.295 Sample mean
δτ 0.05 Auerbach (1989) τn 0.1984 Sample mean
φ 0.038 0 proﬁts in SS τk 0.388 Sample mean
γ 19.1 SS labor of 0.2 G/Y 0.2031 Sample mean
σc 2 Standard value
moments and the moments resulting from artiﬁcial data simulated from the model (details
can be found in Appendix B.5).
In order to simulate data, we ﬁrst need to solve the model non-linearly. Due to the
high-dimensional state space of our model, we employ perturbation methods to obtain an
approximation of the policy function around the deterministic steady state (see e.g. Judd, 1998).
Speciﬁcally, we need to obtain a third-order approximation, because we are interested in the
pure eﬀects of volatility shocks, i.e. when holding the level shocks constant. Loosely speaking,
a ﬁrst-order approximation yields no eﬀects of uncertainty; a second-order approximation
yields both a constant eﬀect and an eﬀect mediated through the corresponding level shock.
Only in the third-order approximation does time-varying uncertainty play a separate role (for
a more detailed explanation, see Appendix B.4).
Table 3 presents the values of parameters we ﬁx prior to the estimation. We set gross
steady state inﬂation ¯ Π to 1 and the discount factor β to 0 99. Regarding the depreciation
parameters, δ0 = 0 05 is chosen to imply a 10% annual depreciation rate, δ1 = 0 0351 sets the
steady state capital utilization to 1, and the depreciation rate for tax purposes δτ is set to
twice the rate of physical depreciation (Auerbach, 1989). The ﬁxed-cost parameter φ = 0 038
implies that ﬁrms make zero proﬁt in steady state and the labor disutility parameter γ = 19 1
sets the steady state share of hours worked to total time to 20%. Regarding the preference
parameters, we set the parameter governing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σc to
2 and set σG = 0 001, the value chosen in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009).13 Hence, preferences
are close to the GHH-speciﬁcation and imply a small wealth eﬀect on the labor supply,
which is consistent with evidence from studies focusing on the eﬀects of news (Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe, 2008) and government spending (Monacelli and Perotti, 2008). The elasticity of
substitution parameters for diﬀerentiated labor services and intermediate goods are set to
13When attempting to estimate this parameter, it hit the lower bound of 0 as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2008). Hence, we ﬁx the parameter to a small value that still assures a balanced growth path.
1810, resulting in a steady state markup of 11%. The capital share α, the steady state tax
rates τk and τn, and the steady state share of government spending to output are set to their
respective sample means.
The empirical moments to be matched are the standard deviations and ﬁrst- and second-
order autocovariances of output, consumption, investment, inﬂation, the real wage, and the
nominal interest rate. Moreover, we target the covariance of output with the other variables.
All variables are logged and detrended using a one-sided HP-ﬁlter with smoothing parameter
λ = 1600. The second and fourth columns of Table 5 display the respective sample moments.14
5.2 Parameter Estimates
Table 4: Parameters estimated by SMM
Parameter Description Mean -1 std.-dev. +1 std.-dev.
φc Consumption habits 0.9665 0.9660 0.9671
δ2/δ1 Capital utilization costs 0.0414 0.0314 0.0546
κ Capital adjustment costs 10.0857 0.8007 127.0438
θp Calvo parameter prices 0.9644 0.9641 0.9646
θw Calvo parameter wages 0.7785 0.7615 0.7947
χp Price indexation 0.4170 0.3809 0.4539
χw Wage indexation 0.9751 0.9725 0.9774
σl Frisch elasticity parameter 0.0683 0.0652 0.0716
ρR Interest smoothing 0.4889 0.4541 0.5238
φπ Taylor rule inﬂation 1.9691 1.9058 2.0422
φy Taylor rule output growth 1.2195 0.8416 1.7671
The parameter estimates are shown in Table 4. All parameters except for the capital
adjustment cost parameter κ are precisely estimated as seen in columns 4 and 5.15 Consumers
have strong habits in consumption with φc = 0 97, which is at the upper end of values generally
considered plausible. Capital utilization costs show little convexity with δ2/δ1 = 0 04, while
capital adjustment is costly as indicated by κ = 10 09, ensuring that investment is not
excessively volatile. Prices are estimated to be quite sticky with θp = 0 96, while the degree
of wage stickiness is moderate with an average duration of 4.3 quarters. The high degree
of price stickiness compared to e.g. Smets and Wouters (2007) reﬂects the absence of real
14Some of the target moments are transformed to correlations for better interpretation. The relative
standard deviations with respect to the standard deviation of output are only implicitly targeted through the
standard deviations of the respective series.
15The conﬁdence bands rely on the asymptotic normality of the estimator as shown in equation (B.18).
However, this is only a rough approximation as most parameters, e.g. the Calvo parameters, have bounded
support. Unfortunately, SMM is computationally too intensive to rely on bootstrapping the standard errors.
19rigidities like a non-constant elasticity of substitution in our setup. The degree of indexation
to past inﬂation is considerably higher for wages than for prices, with the former being almost
perfectly indexed to past inﬂation. An estimated value of σl = 0 07 indicates almost linear
disutility of labor. In the Taylor rule, there is a moderate degree of interest smoothing. The
reaction coeﬃcients of monetary policy are in line with values found in the literature.
Table 5: Simulated and Empirical Moments
Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data
σ(xt) ρ(xt,yt) σxt/σyt ρ(xt,xt−1) ρ(xt,xt−2)
Y 1.44% 1.57% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.90 0.84 0.75
C 0.93% 0.95% 0.71 0.85 0.65 0.60 0.99 0.90 0.95 0.74
I 5.74% 5.30% 0.91 0.85 3.98 3.37 0.88 0.93 0.74 0.80
Π 0.22% 0.27% 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.91 0.50 0.75 0.32
W 0.82% 0.90% 0.23 0.10 0.57 0.57 0.97 0.84 0.91 0.69
R 0.40% 0.39% 0.28 0.34 0.28 0.25 0.73 0.86 0.49 0.67
Notes: Time Series Xt are output (Yt), consumption (Ct), investment (It), inﬂation (Πt), the real wage (Wt),
and the nominal interest rate (Rt). Small letters denote variables that are logged and detrended using a
one-sided HP-ﬁlter with smoothing parameter λ = 1600.
The ﬁrst and third column of Table 5 show the ﬁt of the model. Output is 92% as volatile
in the simulated as model as in the data, while investment is 108% as volatile. The volatility
of consumption is well-matched, while its correlation with output is too low. The volatilities
of the real wage, inﬂation, and the nominal interest rate are on target. Their correlation
with output is also well matched. Only the real wage is somewhat too procyclical. The
autocorrelations are also in general well-matched. Only consumption exhibits a slightly too
high autocorrelation.
5.3 The Eﬀects of Time-Varying Volatility
With the estimated model at hand, we can perform a simple counterfactual experiment to
demonstrate the importance of time-varying volatility for explaining U.S. macroeconomic
time series. However, the eﬀects of time-varying volatility reﬂect both the ex-ante uncertainty
eﬀect of knowing that the shocks are drawn from a wider distribution and the ex-post eﬀect
of more extreme shock realizations. In the next section, we will therefore separate these two
by using the model to keep the level shocks constant.
In Figure 2, we found clear evidence of a decrease in the variance of both the technological
shocks and the policy shocks since the mid 1980s, which contributed to the lower volatility of
output and inﬂation during the Great Moderation. Using our estimated DSGE-model, we
20can ask what a counterfactual economy without time-varying volatility would have looked
like. For this purpose, we completely shut oﬀ time-varying volatility by setting uncertainty
shocks to zero. We then simulate the model again using the new set of driving forces where
both the uncertainty eﬀect and the eﬀects of the corresponding more extreme level shocks
are absent due to σi
t = ¯ σi for all i ∈ {τk,τn,g,m,z,zI}. This unconditional sample mean of
the log-volatility of the level shocks ¯ σi lies between the high volatility pre-Great Moderation
period’s value and the value in the subsequent low volatility Great Moderation phase. The
corresponding simulated moments are presented in Table 6. The co-movement of the model
variables still ﬁts the data quite well. However, compared to the actual data, such an economy
fails to generate suﬃcient volatility: output, consumption, and investment are only about
65%, 73%, and 75% as volatile as the data, respectively.16 In contrast, as seen in Table 5,
the model with time-varying volatility captures the data moments well. These results clearly
indicate the importance of time-varying volatility in explaining U.S. macroeconomic time
series (see e.g. Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008; Primiceri, 2005).
Table 6: Simulated and empirical moments for the model without time-varying volatility
Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data
σ(xt) ρ(xt,yt) σxt/σyt ρ(xt,xt−1) ρ(xt,xt−2)
Y 0.99% 1.57% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.90 0.85 0.75
C 0.71% 0.95% 0.67 0.85 0.72 0.60 0.99 0.90 0.95 0.74
I 3.91% 5.30% 0.89 0.85 3.97 3.37 0.92 0.93 0.79 0.80
Π 0.18% 0.27% -0.19 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.91 0.50 0.76 0.32
W 0.53% 0.90% 0.56 0.10 0.54 0.57 0.97 0.84 0.91 0.69
R 0.30% 0.39% -0.11 0.34 0.30 0.25 0.78 0.86 0.61 0.67
Notes: Time Series Xt are output (Yt), consumption (Ct), investment (It), inﬂation (Πt), the real wage (Wt),
and the nominal interest rate (Rt). Small letters denote variables that are logged and detrended using a
one-sided HP-ﬁlter with smoothing parameter λ = 1600.
6 The Aggregate Eﬀects of Policy Risk
We now turn to analyzing the eﬀects of aggregate uncertainty on business cycle ﬂuctuations.
First, having estimated the deep parameters of the model, we conduct policy experiments
to trace out the eﬀects of uncertainty shocks. We then study their transmission into the
economy and analyze the underlying ampliﬁcation mechanisms. We ﬁnd that the model is in
16If we had used a linearized version of the model, this eﬀect would not have been observed, as periods of
high volatility would oﬀset periods of low volatility. However, due to the non-linearity of our model, this is
not the case here.
21principle able to generate large eﬀects of uncertainty, but that the estimated parameterization
implies that the aggregate eﬀects of uncertainty are quantitatively small. The reason for the
small aggregate response to uncertainty shocks is the presence of general equilibrium eﬀects
that imply only a weak ampliﬁcation.
6.1 Impulse Response Analysis
We ﬁrst analyze the pure uncertainty eﬀect resulting from time-varying volatility by separating
it from the ex-post eﬀect of more extreme shock realizations. We do so by computing impulse
response functions to uncertainty shocks while keeping constant the realizations of the level
shocks.













































































































Figure 3: Impulse responses to a two-standard deviation uncertainty shock to capital taxes,
labor taxes, and government spending (from left to right column).
Notes: Level shocks are held constant. All responses are in percent, except for π which is in
percentage points.
Figures 3 and 4 show the impulse response functions to two-standard deviation policy
risk and technology risk shocks with each column representing the impulse responses to a
diﬀerent shock. The ex-post level eﬀect has been shut oﬀ, which is reﬂected in the ﬂat impulse




























































































Figure 4: Impulse responses to a two-standard deviation uncertainty shock to monetary
policy, TFP, and investment-speciﬁc technology (from left to right column).
Notes: Level shocks are held constant. All responses are in percent, except for π which is in
percentage points.
response for τk,τn, g, m, z, and zI depicted in the bottom row.17 The left column of Figure
3 shows that a capital tax risk shock acts like a positive demand shock. Output and inﬂation
both increase on impact and slowly return to zero. Initially the output response is mostly
driven by the positive response of investment, which has a peak response on impact of 0.014%.
Consumption increases less strongly and follows a hump-shape, peaking after 12 quarters.
Due to the estimated strong degree of habit persistence in consumption, the consumption
response decays only slowly and drives the output response after about four years, when
investment is already almost back to its initial level. The middle and right columns show the
impulse responses to labor tax risk and government spending risk, respectively. Both emulate
the characteristics of a negative supply shock, with output, consumption, and investment
exhibiting a hump-shaped decline, while inﬂation rises.
Labor tax risk induces the strongest output response of all uncertainty shocks considered,
with output showing a peak decline of 0.02% and investment dropping by four times as much.
The reason for this relatively strong response, compared to e.g. the government spending
risk shock, is that a two-standard deviation labor tax risk shock increases uncertainty about
17In the subsequent graphs, we generally omit the ﬂat level impulse responses.
23labor taxes by about 120%, compared to around 60% for the other uncertainty shocks. Due
to the relatively low persistence of the underlying shock process for labor tax risk, the eﬀect
on inﬂation subsides after 10 quarters, while the eﬀect on consumption is again considerable
more drawn out.
The left column of Figure 4 displays the response to a two-standard deviation monetary
policy risk shock. This shock has a contractionary eﬀect on output, mostly driven by a decline
in investment that peaks at -0.03% after 7 quarters. In contrast, consumption reacts sluggishly,
peaking only after 30 quarters. Inﬂation initially drops, overshoots after 10 quarters and then






























































































Figure 5: Impulse responses to a joint two-standard deviation policy risk shock (solid blue
line) and to a joint technology risk shock (dashed red line).
Notes: Level shocks are held constant. All responses are in percent, except for π and realinterest
which are in percentage points.
The historical volatility estimates shown in Figure 2 indicated that uncertainty about the
future path of economic policy increased for all policy instruments during the Great Recession.
We simulate such a situation in the form of a simultaneous two-standard deviation increase in
policy risk.18 Results are shown in Figure 5. A simultaneous two-standard deviation policy
risk shock (solid lines) acts like a negative supply shock. It leads to an immediate decrease in
output of 0.025%, before output slowly returns to its initial level as the shock subsides. This
18Due to the nonlinearity inherent in our model and the solution method that preserves this nonlinearity
up to third order, the resulting impulse responses are not necessarily identical to the sum of the impulse
responses to the individual uncertainty shocks.
24decrease in output is driven by both consumption and investment, with investment dropping
initially by 0.1%. While the capital stock reacts sluggishly due to the presence of relatively
high capital adjustment costs, capital services decline immediately due to an accompanying
decline in capital utilization. At the same time inﬂation rises. As a consequence, the real
wage rises for a few periods, reﬂecting the indexation to the rising inﬂation, and then starts
to decrease, reaching its minimum after 15 quarters. Due to monopolistic competition in
the labor market and the non-separability of the utility function, the initial increase in the
real wage does not induce an increase in labor supplied by the household. Rather, household
members decrease their labor supply and consume more leisure. The real interest rate,
computed as the diﬀerence between the policy rate and inﬂation, declines initially and then
follows a hump-shaped pattern, reaching its peak after 7 quarters. The initial decline in the
real interest rate reﬂects both the interest smoothing present in the estimated Taylor rule as
well as the response of the central bank to the initial strong decline in output. Only when
output starts to recover does the real interest rate rise to bring down inﬂation. The similarity
in both the size and the shape of the impulse response functions of a policy risk shock and
the labor tax risk shock indicates that the latter dominates the eﬀects of the other policy risk
shocks.19
It is instructive to compare the policy risk results to the benchmark of uncertainty about
technology. The middle and right columns of Figure 4 show the impulse responses to a two-
standard deviation risk shock to total factor productivity and investment-speciﬁc technology,
respectively. The response to TFP risk is qualitatively similar to what could have been
expected from the previous literature: it triggers an investment driven decline in output
while inﬂation increases. In contrast, investment-speciﬁc technology risk triggers exactly
the opposite eﬀect: output increases initially and peaks after 4 quarters, with the response
again being mainly driven by the investment response. It is noteworthy that the response to
TFP uncertainty is an order of magnitude smaller than the eﬀects of uncertainty about the
investment-speciﬁc technology shocks. This result suggests that the role of investment-speciﬁc
technology risk might be underappreciated in the uncertainty literature.20 Figure 5 also shows
the impulse responses to a joint technology risk shock of the type occurring in the middle
19While strictly speaking the impulse responses to single shocks are not additive, the opposite signs of
the output response for some sources of uncertainty have important consequences for periods of generally
heightened uncertainty. The simultaneous increase in uncertainty from diﬀerent sources does not necessarily
translate into a large output response. In times like the Great Recession, where policy risk jointly increased,
diﬀerent sources of uncertainty may partially oﬀset each other, resulting in a low overall eﬀect. For example,
Figure 3 documents that capital taxation risk acts expansionary and could more than oﬀset the negative eﬀect
of government spending risk on output and investment.
20While the eﬀects of level shocks to investment-speciﬁc technology have received considerable attention in
recent years (Fisher, 2006; Justiniano et al., 2010; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2011), we are to our knowledge
the ﬁrst to study the eﬀects of uncertainty about investment-speciﬁc technology.
25of the 1970s. The comparison of technology risk (dashed lines) with policy risk (solid lines)
shows that policy risk generates responses that are one order of magnitude larger.
Summarizing, our results show that the ﬁnding of relatively minor eﬀects of uncertainty
on aggregate activity for the case of TFP (Bachmann and Bayer, 2011; Bachmann et al., 2010;
Bekaert et al., 2010; Chugh, 2011; Popescu and Smets, 2010) also holds true for policy risk
and investment-speciﬁc technology risk.
6.2 What Drives the Response to Policy Risk?
Of the transmission channels discussed in Section 2, the precautionary savings motive does
not play a dominant role. In all sets of impulse responses, consumption and investment
move in the same direction, while in the case of a dominant precautionary savings motive we
would expect agents to decrease their consumption in order to self-insure against aggregate
uncertainty by investing in a buﬀer-stock. Of course, it is conceivable that the precautionary
savings motive counteracts the observed eﬀects, which then would have been larger in its
absence.
While it is virtually impossible to disentangle the diﬀerent real option, Hartman-Abel,
and general equilibrium eﬀects, we can gain some insight into the transmission of uncertainty
by shutting oﬀ various features of the model. First, as can be seen by ﬁxing the relative
price of investment to consumption at 1, the real option eﬀect embedded in the depreciation
allowances via the stochastic resale price of capital hardly plays a role. However, while their
role in providing current investment with a tax shield at historical investment prices does not
seem to create strong real option eﬀects in our model, this does not mean that depreciation
allowances do not play an important role. With their eﬀect on Tobin’s marginal q and
the capital utilization decision, they have an important amplifying eﬀect on the investment
response and hence on output. When shutting them oﬀ completely, i.e. setting δτ = 0, capital
drops less and the negative consumption response is cut in half (ﬁgures omitted for brevity).
Second, the low wealth eﬀect on the labor supply implied by the preferences being close to
the GHH-form (σG ≈ 0) has a considerable eﬀect on the responses to uncertainty, amplifying
the response to some shocks and dampening the one to others. As shown in Figure 6, when
setting the preferences to the standard King-Plosser-Rebelo speciﬁcation (σG = 1), the
negative response to labor tax risk declines by two orders of magnitude. At the same time,
the eﬀect of uncertainty shocks that mainly aﬀect the capital margin, i.e. capital tax and TFP
risk, substantially increases, with the former now being the dominant policy risk factor. The
output response to government spending, monetary policy and investment-speciﬁc technology






























































































Figure 6: Impulse responses to a two-standard deviation uncertainty shock to capital taxes,
labor taxes, and TFP (from left to right column).
Notes: solid blue line: KPR-preferences (σG = 1); red dashed line: preferences close to GHH
(σG ≈ 0). Level shocks are held constant. All responses are in percent, except for π which is in
percentage points.
risk stays largely unaltered (ﬁgures omitted for brevity).21
As noted in Section 2, the theoretical literature predicts an ambiguous eﬀect of uncertainty
as real option, Hartman-Abel, and general equilibrium eﬀects drive the dynamics and may
work in opposite directions. That this is actually the case for the speciﬁc types of uncertainty
considered can be seen from, e.g., the impulse response of consumption to a capital tax shock
depicted in the middle left panel of Figure 6. The consumption response is mostly negative
for the case of σG ≈ 0 but unambiguously positive for σG = 1. This suggests that diﬀerent
partial eﬀects are dominating the respective responses for the diﬀerent parameterizations.
While a contractionary eﬀect dominates in the GHH-case, an expansive eﬀect prevails in the
KPR-case. The strong dependence of uncertainty eﬀects on the speciﬁc parameterization
21This ﬁnding of an important role of the preference speciﬁcation for the transmission of uncertainty shocks
suggests that adopting a certain form of utility function may already predetermine the sign of the output
response to an uncertainty shock. Hence, future studies dealing with the eﬀects of uncertainty should devote
more attention to tracing out which preference speciﬁcation may be the most suitable one. Our estimation
results hint at a utility function featuring a low wealth eﬀect on the labor supply. This is in line with an
increasing number of studies from the ﬁscal policy (Monacelli and Perotti, 2008), open economy (Chang and
Fernández, 2010; Garcia-Cicco et al., 2010), and news literature (Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2009; Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe, 2008), which also suggest the presence of a low wealth eﬀect on the labor supply.
27Table 7: Counterfactual calibration implying large uncertainty eﬀects
Parameter Description Estimated mean Counterfactual
φc Consumption habits 0.96 0.9
κ Capital adjustment costs 10.1 5
θp Calvo parameter prices 0.96 0.9
σl Frisch elasticity parameter 0.07 4
ρR Interest smoothing 0.49 0.9
φy Taylor rule output growth 1.22 0
underscores the need for model estimation as opposed to calibration in order to trace out the
aggregate eﬀects of uncertainty.
6.3 Why are the Eﬀects of Uncertainty small?
We identify strong general equilibrium eﬀects – constraining the ampliﬁcation of uncertainty
shocks – as the main reason for the small eﬀect of uncertainty on economic activity. While the
model is in principle capable of generating large real eﬀects of uncertainty, strong stabilizing
eﬀects are required to match the data moments. Therefore, SMM estimates the model
parameters to imply strong equilibrating eﬀects.
Consider the simple counterfactual experiment displayed in Table 7. Here, we decrease
habit persistence, capital adjustment costs, price rigidities, and the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply. To dampen the general equilibrium response of the nominal interest rate, we shut oﬀ
the reaction to output growth and considerably increase the interest smoothing. In this case,
as shown Figure 7, policy risk leads to a drop in output of 1.5%, which is mostly driven by a
large decline in investment. While this calibration allows for larger eﬀects of uncertainty, it
comes at a cost: the model with this calibration implies unrealistically large business cycles.
As shown in Table 8, output would be almost three times as volatile as found in the data,
investment ﬁve times, and wages almost four times as volatile.
Hence, given the estimated exogenous driving processes, SMM estimates the parameters to
imply a shock ampliﬁcation more in line with the actually observed data. First, consumption
habits, capital adjustment costs, and price rigidities are estimated to be quite high, generating a
high persistence and thereby limiting the reaction of consumption, investment, and inﬂation to
shocks and thus the deviations from the ergodic mean that are realized over time. Second, the
parameter governing the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is estimated to be low so household’s
labor supply reacts quite ﬂexibly to shocks. Third and most importantly, monetary policy
reacts fast and decisively to current economic conditions and in particular to output. The

















































































Figure 7: Impulse responses to a two-standard deviation policy risk shock under counterfac-
tually volatile calibration.
Notes: Level shocks are held constant. All responses are in percent, except for π and realinterest
which are in percentage points.
pronounced business cycles.
The decisive reaction to output growth is evident from the large coeﬃcient estimate in
the Taylor rule. The monetary authority’s aggressive reaction to changes in output has a
considerable dampening eﬀect on the business cycle as it prevents output from deviating
too far from steady state. When keeping all parameters at their baseline values but setting
φy = 0, thus shutting oﬀ the response of interest rates to output growth, triples the negative
output response following a policy risk shock (ﬁgures omitted for brevity). The main reason
for this behavior is the response of the real interest rate. The uncertainty shock acts like a
negative supply shock, agents reduce their labor and capital input, and inﬂation rises. The
monetary authority responds to this increase in inﬂation by raising the nominal interest rate
without considering the negative impact on output. As a result, the real interest rate now has
a positive impact response, amplifying the original shock’s contractionary eﬀect on output.
In contrast, if the monetary authority also reacts to changes in output, the interest rate hike
is more muted and the negative output response lower. The real interest initially declines to
counteract the contractionary eﬀect on output and only rises after several quarters.
The fast reaction of nominal interest rates to exogenous shocks can be seen from the
relatively low degree of interest smoothing, meaning that current economic conditions aﬀect
29Table 8: Simulated and Empirical Moments: Counterfactual with stronger ampliﬁcation
Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data
σ(xt) ρ(xt,yt) σxt/σyt ρ(xt,xt−1) ρ(xt,xt−2)
Y 4.47% 1.57% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.90 0.38 0.75
C 0.65% 0.95% 0.45 0.85 0.15 0.60 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.74
I 24.90% 5.30% 0.99 0.85 5.58 3.37 0.63 0.93 0.34 0.80
Π 0.29% 0.27% 0.76 0.17 0.07 0.17 0.80 0.50 0.53 0.32
W 3.55% 0.90% 0.85 0.10 0.79 0.57 0.83 0.84 0.57 0.69
R 0.31% 0.39% -0.90 0.34 0.07 0.25 0.82 0.86 0.57 0.67
Notes: Time Series Xt are output (Yt), consumption (Ct), investment (It), inﬂation (Πt), the real wage (Wt),
and the nominal interest rate (Rt). Small letters denote variables that are logged and detrended using a
one-sided HP-ﬁlter with smoothing parameter λ = 1600.
nominal interests more than past interest rates. This low amount of interest smoothing exerts
a considerable inﬂuence on the economy’s response to uncertainty shocks, allowing a stronger
counteracting reaction of the nominal interest rate, which dampens the uncertainty eﬀects in
a similar way as the output feedback of monetary policy. When giving more weight to past
interest rates compared to the currently desired nominal interest, the nominal interest rate
responds more sluggishly to shocks to the system, thereby temporarily allowing for larger
deviations from steady state.
Hence, our result lend support to the ﬁndings of Bachmann and Bayer (2011). Their study
showed for the case of idiosyncratic uncertainty about technology that general equilibrium
eﬀects, most importantly the endogenous feedback to wages and interest rates may considerably
dampen the output eﬀects of uncertainty shocks. Our results indicate that this also holds
true for the case of aggregate uncertainty in an estimated DSGE-model.
These results suggest a potential issue for studies using a “proof-of-concept”-approach.
Such studies typically show that uncertainty may matter by putting one source of uncertainty
along one level shock into a model and then designing a transmission mechanism that enables
this source to explain the whole business cycle. Our ﬁndings indicate that more attention needs
to be devoted to what happens if other shocks, both uncertainty and level are present. As soon
as other competing sources of aggregate ﬂuctuations documented in the literature are added
to these models, the eﬀects of uncertainty are bound to decrease. Moreover, the approach of
considering only one source of uncertainty and designing a particular ampliﬁcation mechanism
to generate an output drop in response may neglect that specially designed ampliﬁcation
mechanisms may interact with other types of shocks in undesired ways.22
22For example, expansionary output eﬀects of uncertainty, which in our model e.g. arise with capital tax
risk, might be ampliﬁed in the same way.
307 Conclusion
The current paper analyzes the eﬀects of policy risk, i.e. aggregate uncertainty about labor
and capital tax rates, monetary policy, and government spending on aggregate activity. We
ﬁnd that aggregate policy risk has only minor eﬀects on the business cycle. Although its
eﬀects are an order of magnitude larger than the ones of technological uncertainty, a two
standard-deviation policy risk shock still only generates a 0.025% drop in output. The reason
for this small eﬀect is that our parameter estimates imply strong general equilibrium eﬀects
that dampen the aggregate eﬀects of uncertainty on economic activity. Most notably, the
monetary authority’s estimated strong and rapid response to current conditions implies a
nominal interest rate reaction that considerably reduces aggregate ﬂuctuations. While our
model is capable of generating strong uncertainty eﬀects, such a calibration would imply
unrealistically large business cycle ﬂuctuations. Thus, SMM estimates the ampliﬁcation of
uncertainty shocks to be rather low.
The small eﬀect of uncertainty on output does not imply that time-varying volatility is
unimportant. In accordance with the previous literature (e.g. Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008;
Primiceri, 2005), our ﬁndings suggest that the Great Moderation can be explained through
a combination of “good luck” and “good policy”. The historical variance estimates indicate
that the standard deviation of both technology and policy shocks signiﬁcantly decreased since
the mid-1980s. However, most of the eﬀect of this time-varying volatility comes in the form
of a diﬀerent size of the realized level shocks instead of through the uncertainty-eﬀect.
As our analysis focuses on aggregate uncertainty, it does not necessarily contradict studies
ﬁnding large eﬀects of idiosyncratic uncertainty. However, these studies clearly require diﬀerent
transmission mechanisms that do not give rise to large general equilibrium eﬀects (see also
Bachmann and Bayer, 2011).
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A Data construction
Unless otherwise noted, all data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)’s NIPA
Tables and available in quarterly frequency from 1960Q1 till 2010Q3.
A.1 Data for the exogenous processes
Capital and labor tax rates. Our approach to calculate average tax rates closely follows
Mendoza et al. (1994), Jones (2002), and Leeper et al. (2010). We ﬁrst compute the average




W + PRI/2 + CI
,
where IT is personal current tax revenues (Table 3.1 line 3), W is wage and salary accruals
(Table 1.12 line 3), PRI is proprietor’s income (Table 1.12 line 9), and CI ≡ PRI/2 + RI +
CP + NI is capital income. Here, RI is rental income (Table 1.12 line 12), CP is corporate
proﬁts (Table 1.12 line 13), and NI denotes the net interest income (Table 1.12 line 18).
The average labor and capital income tax rates can then be computed as
τ
n =
τp(W + PRI/2) + CSI
EC + PRI/2
,
where CSI denotes contributions for government social insurance (Table 3.1 line 7), and EC
is compensation of employees (Table 1.12 line 2), and
τ
k =
τpCI + CT + PT
CI + PT
,
where CT is taxes on corporate income (Table 3.1 line 5), and PT is property taxes (Table
363.3 line 8).
Government spending. Government spending is the sum of government consumption
(Table 3.1 line 16) and government investment (Table 3.1 line 35) divided by the GDP deﬂator
(Table 1.1.4 line 1) and the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q).
Monetary policy shock. Computed as the residual from a Taylor rule as in Clarida
et al. (2000) (see Appendix B.7). The sample only starts in 1961Q1 as we lose the ﬁrst year
of data due to the use of four time lags as instruments in the GMM estimation.
Total factor productivity (TFP). The construction of TFP closely follows Beaudry




To construct K, we use data on capital services for the private non-farm business sector
(Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Historical Multifactor Productivity Tables),23 multiply
it by the total capacity utilization rate (Federal Reserve System, Statistical Release G.17 -
Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization), and divide it by the civilian noninstitutional
population above 16 years of age (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q). Real GDP per capita Y is
nominal GDP (Table 1.1.5 line 1) divided by the GDP deﬂator (line 1 in Table 1.1.4) and
the population, and per capita hours H are non-farm business hours worked (BLS, Series
PRS85006033) divided by the population. The capital share α is set at 0.295, the mean over
the sample compiled by the BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Historical Multifactor
Productivity Tables). The TFP-series ends in 2009Q4.
Relative price of investment. The relative price of investment is taken from Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2011) and only available until 2006Q4. They base their calculations on
Fisher (2006).
The diﬀerent sample lengths are not an issue as we estimate each exogenous process
separately. Using the longest available sample assures that we make optimal use of the
available information for each series.
A.2 Data for SMM
Output. Nominal GDP (Table 1.1.5 line 1) divided by the GDP deﬂator (Table 1.1.4 line 1)
and the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q).
Investment. Sum of Residential ﬁxed investment (Table 1.1.5 line 12) and nonresidential
ﬁxed investment (Table 1.1.5 line 9) divided by the GDP deﬂator (Table 1.1.4 line 1) and the
civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q).
23Quarterly data is interpolated from the annual series using cubic spline interpolation.
37Consumption. Sum of personal consumption expenditures for nondurable goods (Table
1.1.5 line 5) and services (Table 1.1.5 line 6) divided by the GDP deﬂator (Table 1.1.4 line 1)
and the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q).
Real wage. Hourly compensation in the nonfarm business sector (BLS, Series PRS85006103)
divided by the GDP deﬂator (Table 1.1.4 line 1).
Inﬂation. Computed as the log-diﬀerence of the GDP deﬂator (Table 1.1.4 line 1).
Nominal interest rate. Geometric mean of the eﬀective Federal Funds Rate (St.Louis FED
- FRED Database, Series FEDFUNDS).
A.3 Additional data for GMM
Interest term spread. We use the diﬀerence of the quarterly geometric mean of the 10-Year
Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (FRED Database, Series GS10) and the quarterly geometric
mean of the 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate (FRED Database, Series TB3MS).
Money growth rate. Growth rate of the M2 Money Stock (FRED Database, Series M2SL).
Commodity inﬂation. Commodity inﬂation is computed as the growth rate of the X12-
seasonally adjusted Producer Price Index: All Commodities (FRED Database, Series PPI-
ACO).
Output gap. The output gap is constructed as the percentage diﬀerence between real GDP
(FRED Database, Series GDPC96) and Real Potential Gross Domestic Product (FRED
Database, Series GDPPOT).
B Econometric Methods
B.1 The Particle Filter
For ease of exposition, let xt be a generic observable AR(1) process
xt = ρxt−1 + e
σtνt , νt ∼ N(0,1) (B.1)
where the unobserved/latent state σt follows a stochastic volatility process
σt = (1 − ρ
σ) ¯ σ + ρ
σσt−1 + ηεt , εt ∼ N(0,1), (B.2)
where ¯ σ is is the unconditional mean of σt. The shock to the volatility εt is assumed to be
independent from the level shock νt.
Hence, a ﬁlter is required to obtain the so-called ﬁltering density p(σt|xt;Θ). Due to
38the nonlinearity embedded in the stochastic volatility setup of the shocks, we cannot simply
employ the Kalman ﬁlter as in the case of linearity and normally distributed shocks. Instead,
we employ the Sequential Importance Resampling (SIR) particle ﬁlter, a special application
of the more general class of Sequential Monte Carlo methods, to evaluate the likelihood
(Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez, 2007; Fernández-Villaverde et al., forthcoming).
Given the structure in (B.1) and (B.2) and some initial value x0, the factorized likelihood of






























































where xt is a (t × 1) vector that stacks the observations on x up to time t, Θ stacks the
parameters, and the last equality follows from the assumption of normally distributed shocks.
Although we do not have an analytical expression for p(σt|xt−1;Θ),t = 1,   ,T, and can
therefore not compute it directly, we can employ the particle ﬁlter to estimate the likelihood
by iteratively drawing from p(σt|xt−1;Θ).
The underlying idea of the particle ﬁlter is to use an approximation of the ﬁltering density
p(σt|xt;Θ) with a simulated distribution generated from empirical data. This distribution

















t = 1, ω
i
t > 0 (B.4)
where δ is the Dirac delta function and ωi
t is the weight attached to the respective draw/particle
σi
t (Godsill et al., 2004). We can then use a Sequential Importance Resampling (SIR)-approach
to update particles from time t to t + 1 and obtain the new ﬁltering distribution at t + 1
(see e.g. Fernández-Villaverde et al., forthcoming). A convenient by-product of this ﬁltering
approach is that we also approximate p(σt|xt−1;Θ), the distribution we need to build the
likelihood.
The SIR is a two-step procedure that, by using a prediction and a resampling/ﬁltering step
for each time period, ultimately allows to iteratively draw from p(σt|xt−1;Θ). Starting with
p(σ0|x0;Θ) = p(σ0;Θ), the prediction step uses the law of motion for the states f(σt+1|σt),






i=1 from p(σt|xt;Θ), (here p(σ0|x0;Θ)) and a draw of exogenous shocks
εi






Next, the resampling/ﬁltering step uses importance resampling to update the conditional






draw from p(σt|xt−1;Θ) and {  σi
t}
N

























i=1 = {  σi
t}
N
i=1 is a draw from p(σt|xt;Θ). The resampling with probabilities given
in (B.5) serves two purposes. First, the reweighting implements an importance sampling
approach, i.e. draws are obtained from a proposal density that is easy to draw from and are
then subsequently reweighted to reﬂect the density to be approximated (see Arulampalam
et al., 2002, for a derivation).25 Second, without the resampling step, there would be an
increase in the unconditional variance of ωt over time, yielding only one particle with non-zero
weight (known as degeneracy or sample impoverishment, see Arulampalam et al. (2002)).
By resampling, we keep only those particles with high ωi
t (i.e. those that are closer to the
true state vector). Having now obtained draws from p(σt|xt;Θ), we can again start with the
prediction step to obtain draws for time period t + 1.











































We employ the backward-smoothing routine suggested by Godsill et al. (2004) to draw from the
smoothing density p(σT|xT;Θ) to get a historical distribution of the volatilities. Speciﬁcally,
24The notation t + 1|t indicates a draw at time t + 1 conditioned on the information available at time t.




as the importance density.
26See Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2007) and Doucet and Johansen (2009) and the references














T;Θ)   (B.7)










where the ﬁrst equality results from the Markovian properties of the model and f denotes the
state transition density following from equation (B.2). Equation (B.4) describes how to approx-










where the new weights ωi















t are the weights obtained in the ﬁltering step. Denote with ˜ σi
t the ith draw from the
smoothing density at time t. At time T, we can obtain draws ˜ σi
T by drawing from p(σT|xT)
with the weights ωi
T. Then, going backwards in time, we can use the above recursions to
iteratively obtain draws ˜ σi
t by resampling using the weights given in (B.10).





, and π(Θ) denote the vector of parameters to be estimated, the likelihood
function, and the prior distribution of the parameters, respectively. The posterior distribution











π (Θ)   (B.11)
Given this usually analytically intractable posterior, most macroeconomic applications employ
a Random Walk Metropolis-Hastings (RW-MH) algorithm to generate draws from the posterior
41distribution. However, the standard RW-MH algorithm often has poor mixing properties,
leading to highly autocorrelated draws, and is therefore often very ineﬃcient. Hence, to
increase the eﬃciency, we use the Tailored Randomized Block Metropolis Hastings (TaRB-MH)
algorithm proposed by Chib and Ramamurthy (2010).27 Instead of in each iteration step
simultaneously drawing an entire new parameter vector from a proposal density, the parameter
vector is randomly split up into several blocks. Each block is then subsequently updated by a
separate MH run, conditional on the previous step’s values of the parameters in the other
blocks. Ideally, the blocks should be formed according to the correlation between parameters,
with highly correlated parameters belonging to the same block. However, we have no a priori
knowledge about the correlation between parameters and resort to a blocking scheme where
both the number of blocks and its composition are randomized in each step. This algorithm
provides a good compromise between the standard RW-MH and tailored multiple block MH
algorithms that use multiple blocks, which are particularly designed for the problem at hand.
The second feature that improves on the standard RW-MH is that in each step the proposal
density is “tailored” to the location and the curvature of the posterior density in that block
by using a non-derivative based global optimizer. We deviate from Chib and Ramamurthy
(2010) by using the CMAES algorithm (Hansen et al., 2003) instead of a simulated annealing
as the former has been shown to be more eﬃcient (Andreasen, 2010).28 Moreover, it requires
considerably less tuning than a simulated annealing. The TaRB-MH algorithm proceeds as
follows.
1. At each iteration step n, n = 1,   ,N, the elements of the parameter vector θ are
separated into random blocks (θn,1,θn,2,   ,θn,pn) by perturbing their initial ordering
and assigning the ﬁrst parameter in the perturbed vector to the ﬁrst block and each
following parameter with probability p = 0 5 to a new block, leaving us with 2 5 blocks
on average as we estimate 5 parameters.
2. At each iteration step n, each block θn,l,l = 1,   ,pn is sampled by a Metropolis-
Hastings step using a proposal density adapted to the posterior in the following way.
Denote with θn,−l the most current value of all blocks except for the lth one, i.e. their
value at the end of step n − 1. To generate a new draw for θn,l, the CMAES-algorithm
is used to ﬁnd












That is, we use a global optimizer to maximize the posterior over the current block
l, given the value of all other parameters at the end of step n − 1. Having found the
27Using the TaRB-MH decreased the ineﬃciency factors from values around 10 to below 2.
28For an intuitive introduction to the working of the CMAES algorithm, see Binsbergen et al. (2010).
42“conditional mode” ˆ θn,l, we compute the curvature of the target posterior distribution in

















   
 




Following Chib and Ramamurthy (2010), we use a multivariate t-distribution with ν




. Mean and variance











In the Metropolis-Hastings-step, a proposed value θ∗
n,l is accepted as the new value of





































If the proposed value θ∗
n,l is rejected, we set θn+1,l = θn,l. This step is repeated for all pn
blocks before the algorithm starts over with step 1.
Setting ν = 5 and iterating over steps 1 and 2, we can - after a suitable burn-in-period -
obtain samples from the desired posterior distribution, which is the invariant distribution of
the resulting Markov Chain. In our case, a burn-in of 2500 proved suﬃcient.
B.4 Model Solution
Let st denote the ns × 1 vector of state variables in deviations from steady state, including
the exogenous shocks and the perturbation parameter Λ, and let si
t denote its ith entry. The
policy function/law of motion for an arbitrary model variable   Xt then has the form




































where the ξ’s are scalars that depend on the deep parameters of the model and hats denote per-
centage deviations from steady state. Equation (B.16) shows why lower-order approximations
would not be suﬃcient for our purpose.
As is well known, a ﬁrst-order approximation exhibits certainty equivalence. This implies
ξX
v = 0, where v denotes the position of a volatility shock in the state vector s. That is, up to
43ﬁrst order, uncertainty shocks do not enter the policy function at all.
For a second-order approximation, it is well known from Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004)
for the homoscedastic case that uncertainty only enters the policy function through a constant
term via the second derivative with respect to the perturbation parameter, i.e. through
ξΛ,Λ  = 0. However, things are more complicated in the heteroscedastic case where shocks
to the variance occur, leading to an additional eﬀect. Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2010)
prove that in this case, the volatility shocks additionally only enter the policy function with
non-zero coeﬃcients in their interaction term with the respective level shock. Algebraically,
only the cross-product of ˆ σi × ˆ νi is diﬀerent from 0. In contrast, all other cross-terms with the
uncertainty shocks are zero, i.e ξX
v,j =u = 0, where v and u denote the positions of a volatility
and its corresponding level shock in the state vector s, respectively. Hence, the eﬀect of
uncertainty is always mediated through level shocks. It is not possible to shock the variance
of the level shocks independently from the level shock as its eﬀect would be 0 by construction.
Only in the third-order approximation do the volatility shocks enter the policy function
separately from the level shocks in a non-constant form. Most importantly, the term ξi,Λ,Λ is
in general diﬀerent from 0 for all volatility shocks.
B.5 Simulated Method of Moments
The idea of the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) is the following. Let xt be a time
t vector of observables from a stationary and ergodic distribution and let {xt}
T
t=1 be the
corresponding sequence. Furthermore, let m(xt) denote a k × 1 vector of empirical moments
computed from this data. Denote with {xsim
t (θ)}
aT
t=1 the corresponding time series of length
aT generated from simulating the model using the p×1 parameter vector θ ∈ Θ, with Θ ⊂ Rp.
Let m(xsim
t (θ)) be the vector of simulated moments computed from the artiﬁcial data. The
SMM estimator is the value of θ that satisﬁes


















where W is a p × p positive deﬁnite weighting matrix. Under the assumption that the model
with θ = θ0 is a correct representation of the true process that generated m(xt) and the
regularity conditions spelled out in Duﬃe and Singleton (1993), ˆ θ is a consistent estimator of



























and J = E(∂m(xsim
t )/∂θ) (see Ruge-Murcia, 2010).



















The ideal weighting matrix places the most weight on the linear combination of moments
that are the most precisely measured in the data. However, for two reasons, we use only the








First, we would like to put more weight on moments that are actually observed in the data and
that are economically meaningful, rather than on a linear combination of moments (see also
Cochrane, 2005). Second, in practice, fully speciﬁed weighting matrices often lead to diverging
parameter estimates. As shown in Ruge-Murcia (2010), using only the main diagonal of the
optimal weighting matrix leads to a loss in eﬃciency but nevertheless delivers good results in
most cases.
The simulation proceeds as follows. Starting at the deterministic steady state, we simulate
the model for 3015 quarters using shocks drawn from the estimated shock distributions.
Shocks larger than two standard deviations are trimmed. To assure non-explosive behavior of
the simulations, we use the pruning algorithm of Kim et al. (2008). We discard the ﬁrst 2000
quarters as a burn-in in order to reach the ergodic distribution. We then use the remaining
1015 quarters to compute the respective moments. The results are robust to using a longer
burn-in period. The choice of using ﬁve times the length of the original data sample (i.e.
a = 5) to compute the moments is motivated by the simulations in Ruge-Murcia (2010),
who ﬁnds this choice to deliver a good balance between the precision of the estimates and
computation time.
B.6 Impulse Responses
The nonlinearity of our model complicates the computation of impulse responses compared
to linear models. We follow Fernández-Villaverde et al. (forthcoming) and generate impulse
responses as the response to a two standard deviation shock to uncertainty at the ergodic
mean. First, we simulate the model for 2,000 quarters by drawing shocks from the respective
45estimated distributions. Shocks larger than two standard deviations are trimmed to assure
convergence, which technically depends on the shocks being bounded. To assure non-explosive
behavior of the simulations, we use the pruning algorithm of Kim et al. (2008). We discard
the ﬁrst 2,000 quarters as a burn-in in order to reach the ergodic distribution and use the
next 675 quarters to compute the ergodic mean. Starting at the ergodic mean, we compute
the IRFs as the percentage diﬀerence of the respective variables between the system shocked
with the respective shock and the baseline model response, i.e. the model response without
shocks. To account for sampling uncertainty, we generate 50 diﬀerent IRFs with diﬀerent
starting values of the random number generator and take the cross-sectional average as our
impulse response.
B.7 GMM
We construct the monetary policy shocks by specifying the Federal Reserve’s policy reaction
function and estimating it by the generalized method of moments (GMM). Our approach is
similar to the one used in Clarida et al., 2000, with the diﬀerence that Clarida et al., 2000 use
a forward-looking policy reaction function, while we use a rule that reacts to contemporaneous
variables to stay consistent with our DSGE-model. Speciﬁcally, the policy reaction function
to be estimated is given by
rt = ρrt−1 + (1 − ρ)[¯ r + φπ (πt − ¯ π) + φyy
gap
t ] + εt , (B.22)
where πt is inﬂation with target rate ¯ π, y
gap
t is the output gap, rt−1 allows for interest
smoothing, ¯ r ist the target nominal interest rate, and εt is an error term. Using the vector
of instruments zt, the set of moment conditions for our GMM estimation procedure can be
written as
E [{rt − ρrt−1 − α − βπt − γy
gap
t }zt] = 0 (B.23)
where α = (1 − ρ)(¯ r + φπ¯ π) collects all constant terms, β = (1 − ρ)φπ, and γ = (1 − ρ)φy.
Hence, we regress the average eﬀective Federal Funds Rate in the ﬁrst month of the quarter
on the lagged FFR, the inﬂation rate, and the output gap, where all rates are annualized.
The set of instruments includes four lags of the FFR, the inﬂation rate, the output gap,
commodity price inﬂation, money growth, and the interest term spread. Because we are only
interested in the residuals of the policy reaction function   εt, we do not need to separately
identify the target nominal rate ¯ r and target inﬂation ¯ π.
Table 9 presents the estimation results, which are all in the range typically reported in the
literature. There is strong evidence of interest smoothing with ρ = 0 898. The point estimates
46Table 9: GMM Estimation of Taylor Rule
Coeﬃcient Mean Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
ρ 0 898 0 018 48 926 0 000
α 0 001 0 001 0 874 0 383
β 0 1741 0 027 6 361 0 000
γ 0 102 0 017 5 950 0 000
R-squared 0 890 Mean dependent var 0 058
Adjusted R-squared 0 888 Sum squared resid 0 027
S.E. of regression 0 012 J-statistic 18 545
Durbin-Watson stat 2 314 pval(J-statistic) 0 552
Note: Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth: Fixed (4), No prewhitening; Simultaneous weighting matrix & coeﬃcient
iteration; Convergence achieved after: 28 weight matrices, 29 total coef iterations.
of the feedback parameters are φπ = 1 718 and φy = 1 003. The test of overidentifying
restrictions shows that the model cannot be rejected at conventional signiﬁcance levels.
C Diagnostics
C.1 Testing for Heteroscedasticity
Table 10 presents evidence of the need to model time-varying volatility. Despite our relatively
short sample size and the low power of tests for heteroscedasticity, the null hypothesis of
homoscedastic shocks can be rejected at the 10% level for all series except labor taxes. This
result is consistent with evidence that the standard deviation of structural shocks has changed
over time (see e.g. Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008; Primiceri, 2005).
Table 10: Tests for Heteroscedasticity
τk τn z zI g m
White 0.000* 0.932 0.001* 0.042* 0.360 0.068*
WW 0.169 0.523 0.265 0.005* 0.076* 0.068*
BPK 0.004* 0.890 0.126 0.770 0.511 0.298
Notes: Asterisks indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% level. White refers to the standard White (1980)-test, WW
refers to the Wooldridge (1990)-version of this test, and BPK refers to the Breusch and Pagan (1979)/Koenker
(1981)-test.
47C.2 Convergence Diagnostics
Table (11) shows the results from the Geweke (1992)-convergence diagnostics that compares
the means of the ﬁrst 20% of draws with that of the last 50% of the draws. In general, all
MCMC chains have converged to their stationary distribution as indicated by the p-values of
the χ2-test for equal means. Figures 8 to 13 show the corresponding mean plots.
Table 11: Geweke (1992) Convergence Diagnostics
Parameter 4% taper 8% taper 15% taper 4% taper 8% taper 15% taper
Capital Tax Rates Labor Tax Rates
ρ1 0.160 0.165 0.145 0.909 0.890 0.887
ρ2 0.947 0.941 0.937 0.926 0.913 0.904
ρσ 0.623 0.596 0.566 0.648 0.652 0.653
ησ 0.929 0.927 0.919 0.327 0.319 0.271
¯ σ 0.760 0.744 0.738 0.922 0.921 0.917
Total Factor Productivity Investment Speciﬁc Technology
ρ1 0.891 0.887 0.879 0.199 0.174 0.124
ρ2 0.679 0.681 0.665 0.353 0.340 0.297
ρσ 0.643 0.615 0.583 0.546 0.534 0.520
ησ 0.456 0.453 0.391 0.638 0.649 0.638
¯ σ 0.772 0.765 0.706 0.304 0.260 0.187
Government Spending Monetary Policy Shock
ρ1 0.608 0.598 0.572 0.192 0.200 0.181
ρ2 0.605 0.606 0.558
ρσ 0.550 0.561 0.562 0.231 0.227 0.155
ησ 0.293 0.267 0.232 0.885 0.870 0.860
¯ σ 0.412 0.402 0.369 0.066 0.078 0.071
Notes: Numbers are p-values of the χ2-test for equal means of the ﬁrst 20% of draws and the last 50% of the
draws (after the ﬁrst 2500 draws are discarded as burn-in).









































































(b) Mean of the parameters over time.
Figure 8: Evolution of MCMC sampler over time for τk.









































































(b) Mean of the parameters over time.
Figure 9: Evolution of MCMC sampler over time for τn.











































































(b) Mean of the parameters over time.
Figure 10: Evolution of MCMC sampler over time for z.






































































(b) Mean of the parameters over time.
Figure 11: Evolution of MCMC sampler over time for zI.













































































(b) Mean of the parameters over time.
Figure 12: Evolution of MCMC sampler over time for g.




























































(b) Mean of the parameters over time.
Figure 13: Evolution of MCMC sampler over time for m.
54C.3 Model Misspeciﬁcation Diagnostics
Following Kim et al. (1998), we can test the speciﬁcation of our SV-model. Using N draws
from the prediction density p(xt|xt−1;Θ), we can compute the probability that xt+1 will be






































∀t = 1,   T − 1. If the SV-model is correctly speciﬁed, the sequence of ut converges in
distribution to i i d  uniform variables as the number of particles N goes to inﬁnity (Rosenblatt,
1952). Under the null hypothesis of a correctly speciﬁed model, the ut can be transformed
to i i d  standard normal variables using the inverse normal CDF. Hence, we can perform a
simple test for misspeciﬁcation by testing the resulting series for their normality. Figure 14
shows the corresponding QQ-plots.





























































































































































































Figure 14: QQ-plots. From left to right and top to bottom: capital taxes, labor taxes,
TFP, investment-speciﬁc technology, monetary policy shocks, and government
spending.
Table 12 presents the results from three commonly used normality tests. In general, a
correct speciﬁcation of the model tends to not be rejected. Only for z, the Jarque-Bera and
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reject normality. However, this eﬀect is driven by the outliers
55visible in the bottom left corner of Figure 14. In contrast, when shutting oﬀ the time-varying
volatility and setting the volatility to its unconditional mean, the speciﬁcation is generally
rejected (results are not shown here).
Table 12: Tests for Model Misspeciﬁcation
JB KS SW
τk 0.066 0.039** 0.125
τn 0.141 0.960 0.135
z 0.037** 0.035** 0.085
zI 0.377 0.076 0.586
g 0.500 0.747 0.528
m 0.052 0.377 0.012**
Note: Asterisks indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% level. JB refers to the Jarque and Bera (1987)-test, KS refers
to the Kolmogorov (1933)/Smirnov (1948)-test, and SW refers to the Shapiro and Wilk (1965)-test.
56